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RESUMO/ABSTRACT 
 
Labor Market Regulations and Trade Patterns: the Panel Data Analysis 
within a Modified Ricardian Setting 
  
The paper focuses on the question of how labor market regulations can affect a 
country’s competitive position in international trade and international trade 
patterns. The analysis shows that differences in labor market flexibility between 
countries affect their competitive positions in international markets and can 
serve as an independent cause of international trade. It is argued that an 
increase in labor market flexibility may change the relative price of goods within 
the country making it more competitive in international markets for commodities 
with uncertain demand. Changes in relative prices can alter countries’ 
comparative advantage and thus international trade patterns. Furthermore, it is 
shown that due to the differences in relative prices resulting from different labor 
market regulations, international trade between countries can be observed even 
if they are identical in all respects (e.g., labor productivity and production 
technology). Data reveal that a country with a more flexible labor market has 
comparative advantage in, and tends to export, goods with more variable 
demand (e.g., fashionable clothes, seasonal toys), while a country with a more 
rigid labor market has a comparative advantage in, and tends to export, 
commodities with more stable demand.  
 
 
 
JEL Classification: F100, D800 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ainura Uzagalieva 
Departamento de Economia e Gestão 
Universidade dos Açores 
Rua da Mãe de Deus, 58 
9501-801 Ponta Delgada 
 
 
Labor Market Regulations and Trade Patterns: the Panel Data Analysis 
within a Modified Ricardian Setting * 
 
Ainura Uzagalieva** 
(CEEAplA, CERGE-EI) 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper focuses on the question of how labor market regulations can affect a country’s 
competitive position in international trade and international trade patterns. The analysis 
shows that differences in labor market flexibility between countries affect their 
competitive positions in international markets and can serve as an independent cause of 
international trade. It is argued that an increase in labor market flexibility may change the 
relative price of goods within the country making it more competitive in international 
markets for commodities with uncertain demand. Changes in relative prices can alter 
countries’ comparative advantage and thus international trade patterns. Furthermore, it is 
shown that due to the differences in relative prices resulting from different labor market 
regulations, international trade between countries can be observed even if they are 
identical in all respects (e.g., labor productivity and production technology). Data reveal 
that a country with a more flexible labor market has comparative advantage in, and tends 
to export, goods with more variable demand (e.g., fashionable clothes, seasonal toys), 
while a country with a more rigid labor market has a comparative advantage in, and tends 
to export, commodities with more stable demand.  
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1. Introduction 
International trade plays a key role in the strategies of poverty reduction, 
economic growth and affects overall national development. In many cases, however, 
geographical location, high transportation costs or the lack of advanced technologies do 
not allow countries to benefit from international exchange. There exist regions where 
countries with similar technological levels, climate conditions and regulatory framework, 
lacking a clear comparative advantage, compete with each other on international markets 
and, except for some trade in natural resources, cannot fully explore benefits of 
international exchange within and outside the region.  
Most of the factors (e.g., geographical location, high transportation costs, climate 
conditions, and the lack of advanced technologies) that affect countries’ comparative 
advantage cannot be changed by policymakers. However, appropriate institutional 
settings and regulations determining business conditions can increase economic 
efficiency, decrease domestic prices of selected products, and thus, increase a country’s 
price competitiveness on international markets. Although general links between business 
environment and price competitiveness seem to be clear, the impact of various policy 
measures on producers and market prices needs to be clarified in many cases. This study 
focuses on the relation between labor market regulations, international competitiveness,1 
and patterns of trade. Specifically, we argue that policy measures which increase labor 
market flexibility may change the relative price of goods within a country, making it 
more competitive in international markets for commodities with volatile demand,2 and, 
consequently, that flexibility of the labor market can be considered an important factor 
that would stimulate exports of a broad range of products, especially those with high 
demand volatility.  
Another important theoretical point to be gained from this study is that since an 
increase in labor market flexibility may change the relative price of goods within the 
                                                          
1We refer to the academic definition of international competitiveness which is: “Competitiveness of 
Nations is a field of Economic theory, which analyzes the facts and policies that shape the ability of a 
nation to create and maintain an environment that sustains more value creation for its enterprises and more 
prosperity for its people” [see International Institute for Management Development (IMD) World 
Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY): 2003]. 
2The group of products with volatile demand includes seasonal products (e.g., processed meat, fish, fruit, 
vegetables, and fats), clothes, toys and other items related to, for example, fashionable movies. 
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country, it can also alter countries’ comparative advantage and thus international trade 
patterns. In particular, we show that due to the differences in relative prices, which result 
from different labor market regulations, international trade between countries can be 
observed even if the countries are identical in all respects (e.g., labor productivity, 
production technology, and consumption preferences). The analysis reveals that a country 
with a more flexible labor market has comparative advantage in, and tends to export, 
goods with more variable demand, while a country with a more rigid labor market has 
comparative advantage in, and tends to export, commodities with more stable demand.  
The analysis presented in this paper has been motivated by an observation that 
within a single industry commodities with relatively stable demand are produced 
throughout the world, while very similar goods with more volatile demand are produced 
in particular countries only. One can think about the textile or toy industry where 
products with relatively stable demand (e.g., traditional clothing) are produced in both 
developed (with high wages) as well as developing (with low wages) countries, while 
technologically similar products with more volatile demand (e.g., ethnic-style clothing, 
toys, cards, CDs, and similar products such as movie tie-ins, for example, Star Wars, 
Matrix, The Lord of the Rings, and Harry Potter) are produced exclusively in developing 
countries with very liberal labor market regulations.3 Another example includes the 
export of watches and clocks,4 which have more stable demand on the world markets and 
are produced throughout the world, versus agricultural goods with high variability such as 
meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, and fats which have a larger share in the exports of 
developing countries. This simple example shows that large scale production of goods 
with volatile demand, and their export to international markets, may significantly 
                                                          
3The market for such products is huge. To illustrate the scale, one can consider solely the market for Harry 
Potter related products, where the total earnings (until the summer of 2003) from the sales of books, 
movies, video tapes, CDs, video games, and clothes exceeded 3.5 billion USD. In other words, the total 
earnings from such products exceed the yearly GDP of a number of developing countries (for comparison, 
the GDP of the Kyrgyz Republic amounted to 1.7 billion USD in 2003). See the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank (IBRD/WB), 2005: World Development Indicators 
(WDI). 
4The comparison of export shares (61 products) across 37 countries based on the standard deviation of each 
product’s sales shows that the watches and clocks group has the lowest variation (0.001), while the group 
of processed meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, and fats has the highest variation of sales (0.194) during the 
period from 1995 to 2002.  
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improve countries’ balance of payments and could have a positive impact on the 
economy as a whole.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the concept of labor 
market flexibility. Section 3 focuses on the speed of labor market adjustment to new 
market conditions. An autarky regime in a simple Ricardian setting under price 
uncertainty is analyzed in section 4. Section 5 explores the impact of labor market 
flexibility on international trade. In section 6 key theoretical results are confronted with 
empirical data and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The concept of labor market flexibility 
The concept of labor market flexibility refers to various phenomena and can be 
defined by at least three of the following important dimensions (Hamermesh 1996; 
Pissarides 1997). First, it is related to organizational and productive aspects at the 
company level, namely, to the ability of a firm to vary its production volume and to 
introduce new models and products. Second, it refers to the capacity and skills of 
employees (e.g., building multiple skills, training workers for different production 
operations, and tasks). Third, it is applied to employment policies, wage adjustments, 
changes in work schedules, and hiring and firing procedures consistent with production 
needs.5 Labor market flexibility is also related to the population aging phenomenon since 
old workers are generally less mobile and incur high costs resulting from firms’ 
adjustment to demand shocks (Kuhn 2003).    
Although labor market flexibility can be related to several phenomena, it can be 
characterized by the speed of adjustment in response to various shocks in an economy 
(Pissarides 1997). The virtue of the latter is that one labor market is more flexible than 
the other one if it adjusts to a given shock faster. In a perfectly flexible labor market, 
workers are free to allocate their services in response to shifting relative wage 
opportunities, while firms are free to adjust the workforce in response to shifting relative 
profit opportunities. Moreover, it is assumed that both workers and firms adapt 
immediately to any changes in market conditions and in labor demand.6 
                                                          
5These include, for example, contracts for certain tasks, part-time work or at-home work. 
6Departing from a neoclassical model (perfectly flexible labor market), decreasing labor market flexibility 
leads to the other theoretical extreme: the Keynesian concept of rigid labor market (rigid real wages). 
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In real life, however, there are several constraints that limit the ability of firms and 
workers to quickly adjust to changing market conditions and labor demand. Employment 
protection is one of them. It refers to hiring and firing practices on unfair dismissals, lay-
off restrictions, severance payments, minimum notice periods, and security against job 
dismissals. Employment protection can originate from various institutional arrangements. 
When labor markets are not regulated, employment protection is based on wage 
compensation schemes and collective bargaining. Namely, firms with high dismissal rates 
pay workers a compensating wage for occupational hazards. This fact causes firms to 
implement either an adjustment strategy, through retraining workers and marginal 
regulations (e.g., attrition, early retirement, work sharing, and severance payments), or 
firing workers and accepting higher compensating wages. The problems of permanent 
lay-offs are dealt by unions which represent a collective bargaining mechanism for 
protecting work places. However, when markets fail (e.g., externalities, imperfect 
competition, insufficient information, and public goods), the wage compensation 
mechanism and collective bargaining do not work. In this case governments legislate 
employment protection through imposing restrictions of different kinds. According to the 
World Bank (WB), the constraints of labor market flexibility can be ordered from the 
most (1) to the least (5) severe: 1) hiring difficulties; 2) hours rigidities; 3) firing 
difficulties; 4) employment rigidities; and 5) firing costs.7  
Three basic types of employment protection measures are distinguished in the 
literature (Bertola, Boeri, Cazes 1999; Boeri, Nicoletti, Scarpetta 2000; Hamermesh 
1996). The first type includes provisions affecting fixed costs per worker (e.g., the 
statutory guarantees of payments to workers, various agreements to limit overtime or 
provide shorter working time). The second type includes provisions that affect the cost of 
labor adjustment (e.g., redundancy payments, subsidies to retain employees and 
provisions for unfair dismissals).8 The third type consists of provisions affecting the 
process of labor adjustment such as lay-offs by inverse seniority, restrictions on hiring, 
and various pre-notifications regarding factory closings or redundancies.  
                                                          
7See the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank (IBRD/WB), 2005: 
Doing business in 2005.  
8Statutory rights against unfair dismissals exist in all countries except the United States (see Bertola, Boeri, 
and Cazes 1999). 
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No matter what the type of employment protection and which institutional 
measures it originates from, any kind of employment protection arrangements, enforcing 
hiring and firing rules, unemployment benefits, and minimum wages are regarded as 
factors decreasing labor market flexibility. These factors constrain the free choice of 
workers and firms and increase the inertia of the labor market (i.e., reduce the speed of 
labor adjustment to new market conditions). Not going into the details of labor market 
regulations, in this paper, following Pissarides (1997), we assume that one labor market is 
more flexible than the other one if firms can faster adjust employment to the new market 
conditions.  
 
3.  The speed of labor market adjustment and a firm’s input-output decisions 
As discussed in the preceding section, we assume that if the labor market is 
perfectly flexible, firms are able to adjust the amount of labor needed in the production 
process to observed market conditions immediately. Any decrease in labor market 
flexibility makes the adjustments of labor input slower, i.e., increases labor market 
inertia. Since labor market regulations are usually the same for all sectors in the 
economy, in the deterministic case (i.e., when the demand for goods is certain) they 
should have the same impact on all industries. Therefore, labor market regulations would 
not affect relative prices, and thus, a country’s comparative advantage. Under uncertainty 
of demand, however, all inputs in the production process which are not perfectly flexible 
(i.e., cannot be adjusted immediately) need to be chosen before the output is produced 
and the price of real output is observed. Provided that firms are not risk neutral, but risk-
averse,9 the uncertainty about output price affects the optimal input/output decisions of 
firms (Leland 1972; Yu and Ingene 1993) and, consequently, the relative prices of goods 
with different output price variability. 
To clarify the relationship between the uncertainty of output price and firms’ 
optimal input/output decisions, consider a single commodity market and assume that the 
price of the unit of output produced is uncertain and can be represented as the sum of two 
terms, a fixed term (expected value) and a random term (ηt) at any period of time t (t is an 
                                                          
9A similar assumption was made by Sandmo (1971), Leland (1972), Cukrowski and Aksen (2003) and 
Cukrowski, Fischer and Aksen (2002). As indicated by Leland, risk neutrality is frequently assumed just for the 
sake of simplicity (see Leland, 1972, for detailed discussion).  
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integer number such that −∞<t<+∞). For the sake of simplicity, assume that the random 
variables (ηt) are identically distributed with zero mean and finite variance (σt2). Assume, 
moreover, that the random deviations from the mean price (ηt) are described by a 
stationary stochastic process with a memory (e.g., by the auto-regressive processes of any 
order). This means that the variance and covariance of random variables (ηt) are invariant 
with respect to displacement in time (i.e., Var(ηt)=Var(η)=σ2>0, Cov(ηt,ηt+s)≠0 for 
s=0,1,..., and integer valued t (−∞<t<+∞), and that firms can observe real values of ηt at 
each period).  
Since various labor market regulations, which result in a different degree of labor 
market flexibility, affect the speed of labor adjustment to changing market conditions, 
they also determine the time interval needed for labor input fine-tuning. In other words, 
the degree of labor market flexibility determines the time length between the moment 
when a firm’s decision on its input/output plan is enacted and the moment when its 
output is supplied to the market and real output price is observed. Note that if the labor 
market is not perfectly flexible, the firm’s input/output decision needs to be made before 
the real demand is known (based on forecasts). Consequently, in the moment of decision 
making perceived market price variability is inversely related to the flexibility of the 
labor market. This is  because  the forecast error of deviation from an expected demand 
equals zero and its variance increases with the time elapsed from observations to the 
moment when real output price is revealed  (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991). For example, 
if  random deviations follow  the first-order autoregressive process [e.g., ηt=φ1ηt-1+εt, 
where  φ1  is a  constant parameter and εt  is a random disturbance  term with  zero mean 
and  variance  σε2  under the normal distribution N(0, σε2)], the s period forecast 
estimated in period T, ηtf(s), is  ηtf(s)=φ1sηT. The forecast error of s periods  ahead,  eT(s), 
is given as eT(s)=εT+s+φ1εT+s-1+…+φ1s-1εT+1, and it has a variance 
E[eT(s)2]=(1+φ12+φ14+...+φ12s-2)σε2,  which increases (nonlinearly) as s becomes larger 
(Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Forecast errors in a first-order autoregressive process 
 
4. Price uncertainty and an autarky regime in a Ricardian setting 
For the sake of simplicity the analysis which follows is based on the international 
trade model in a simple Ricardian setting. The original model is extended by assuming 
that demand for one good (out of two goods considered) is uncertain. More precisely, two 
goods, X and Y, are produced in a perfectly competitive environment, but there is always 
uncertainty about the price of the first good (X). The technology is summarized by the 
productivity of labor, which is expressed in terms of the unit labor requirement (i.e., the 
number of hours required to produce one unit of each good) in each industry. For future 
reference let us define aLX and aLY as the unit labor requirements in the production of X 
and Y goods, respectively. The limits of production in this economy can be determined by 
the inequality  
(1)       aLXQX+aLYQY≤L, 
where  
(2)                      QX=LX/aLX , and 
(3)                           QY=LY/aLY , 
denote, respectively, the quantities of goods X and Y produced in the economy; LX and LY 
describe the amount of labor employed in the sectors X and Y, correspondingly; L is the 
total labor supply.  
To determine what the economy will actually produce, one needs to know the 
expected relative price of goods. The price of good X is random and can be represented 
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as pX(θ), where θ is a stochastic parameter that characterizes the state of the world, such 
that  
(4)          ,   
where       is the expected price of the commodity X. Thus, the supply of good X in the 
competitive economy is determined by the attempts of firms to maximize their expected 
utilities from profits. All firms are assumed to be managed by risk-averse managers10 
and, therefore, their attitudes towards risk can be characterized in a von Neumann-
Morgenstern fashion in the form of a utility function (Sandmo 1971; Leland 1972). Risk 
aversion implies that utility function U of profit π is strictly concave: U’(π)>0 and 
U’’(π)<0. Thus, each firm operating in industry X selects the quantity of output qx to 
maximize the expected utility from profit 
(5)                                     )]}([{ xq qUEMaxx
π . 
The first order condition (FOC) in a perfectly competitive environment can be 
represented as 
(6) 
where  
(7)      xLXXX qwap ])([ −= θπ ,  
and qX denotes output of a single firm and w stands for wage in the economy. 
 The second order condition (SOC) is 
(8)                               0]))()(([ 2'' <−= LXXX wapUED θπ .  
Rearranging FOC we get  
(9)                                       
)]('[
)]()('[
X
XX
LX UE
pUEwa π
θπ= . 
 Expression (9) allows us to prove the following important proposition: 
 
Proposition 1.  Under uncertainty, perfectly competitive firms equate marginal cost to a 
certain value bigger than the price under certainty ( Xp ), i.e., 
(10)                                      X
X
XX p
UE
pUE >
)]('[
)]()('[
π
θπ . 
                                                          
10 See Mayer (1978) and Batra (1974). 
XX ppE =)]([ θ
Xp
 0 ,]})()[( { ' =− LXXX wap U E θπ
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Proof: 
Let )(' XU π be the marginal utility of profit for θθ = , such that 0)( =− XX pp θ . 
Since the marginal utility is decreasing and all profits are non-negatively correlated, we 
must have that )()( '' XX UU ππ ≤  for θ , such that 0)( ≥− XX pp θ . Multiplying both 
sides of the inequality above by XX pp −)(θ , we get  
(11)  ))()(())()(( '' XXXXXX ppUppU −≤− θπθπ .  
If 0)( ≤− XX pp θ , then )()( '' XX UU ππ ≥ , and consequently the sign in the last 
inequality is unaffected. Taking expectation we have   
(12)                  0)])([()()])()(([ '' =−≤− XXXXXX ppEUppUE θπθπ ,  
and taking into account that          
(13)                      0)]([)]()(([)])()(([ ''' ≤−=− XXXXXXX pUEpUEppUE πθπθπ ,  
we get  
(14) XXXX pUEpUE ≥)]([)]()([ '' πθπ .   
                                                                          Q.E.D 
 
An important implication of Proposition 1 is that the total output of industry X under 
uncertainty is smaller than it would be under certainty.  
Perfect competition in industry Y (without uncertainty) implies that the price of 
the good Y, Yp , equals marginal cost:  
(15)                                     LYY apw /= . 
Since wage rates need to be equal across sectors, we have 
(16)                                     LYLXYXYXYX aappppEppE =≥= ][][ . 
It follows from the expression (16) that in industry X the expected relative price of goods 
X and Y under uncertainty will be higher than in the certainty case.  
The proposition below reveals a link between the magnitude of price fluctuations 
and the expected relative price of the goods X and Y. 11 
                                                          
11 The analysis presented in this paper can be replicated in a more general and more complex setting with 
two sectors and two production factors (as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade), but the 
complexity of the model makes it hardly readable. As an example, a link between labor market flexibility, 
expected relative prices within the country, and country price competitiveness in international markets in 
the model with two sectors and two production factors is analysed in the appendix. 
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Proposition 2. An increase in the price variability of good X with uncertain demand 
decreases the amount of labor allocated to the production of commodity X 
and increases the expected relative price of goods X and Y. 
Proof.  
Consider the effect of a marginal increase in uncertainty on the demand for labor 
input. To present the notion of increased uncertainty, define an increased variability in 
the density function of the price of good X in terms of a “mean preserving spread,”12 i.e., 
define random variable pX* as  
 (17)                                           ϖγ += XX pp* , 
where pX* is a random price, ϖ and γ are shift parameters which initially equal zero and 
unity, respectively. The mean preserving spread type of the shift in the density function 
of pX* leaves mean E[pX*] unchanged, that is 
(18)                        0][][ * =+=+= ϖγϖγ ddppdEpdE XXX . 
Substituting pX* by pX in the FOC of sector X, we obtain  
(19)                               E[U′(πX)(γpX+ϖ-waLX)]=0,   
where  
(20)                                        xLXXX qwap ])[( −+= ϖγπ . 
Differentiating (20) with respect to γ and taking into account that Xpdd −=γϖ  we get 
(21)      )])(([1)])()(([1 ''' XXXLXXXXXXX ppUED
wapppUE
D
q
d
dq −−−−−= ππγ , 
where D is the SOC determined by expression (8).     
            The second term in expression (21) is negative and the first term is generally 
indeterminate.13 However, in the particular case when we assume that the initial situation 
is such that  XX pp =  and an increased uncertainty causes only a very small increase in 
risk, then a certain price can be replaced by the probability distribution with all outcomes 
                                                          
12 Defining a change in uncertainty in terms of a change in the probability distribution, while keeping its 
mean constant, is quite common in economic theory (see, for example, in  Sandmo (1971), Rothenberg and 
Smith (1971), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971).  
13At this level of formalization, making a clear statement on the marginal effect of uncertainty on output is 
unlikely. To deal with this difficulty, one can focus on a particular case when the marginal impact of 
uncertainty is identical to its overall impact, i.e., when increased uncertatinty leads to just a little more risky 
distribuition than the initial one (see Sandmo 1971). 
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concentrated in the neighborhood of Xp . And, if price is known to be equal to Xp , the 
marginal cost is also equal to Xp . So, we must have 
                                       LXX wap = , and 
(22) )].)(([1)])()(([1 ''' XXXXXXXXXX ppUED
ppppUE
D
q
d
dq −−−−−= ππγ  
(23)                           0]))(([1 2'' <−− XXXX ppUEDq π . 
Therefore, if the distribution of prices is concentrated around its mean value 0/ <γddqX , 
an increase in price volatility decreases the quantity of output produced and increases the 
expected price of good X.14 Taking into account that the price of good Y is deterministic, 
we conclude that an increase in the price variability of good X has two effects. First, since 
the quantity of output produced is proportional to the quantity of labor used, it decreases 
the amount of labor allocated to the production of commodity X. Second, it increases the 
expected relative price of goods X and Y.   
                                                       Q.E.D. 
 One implication of Proposition 2 is that higher labor market flexibility resulting in 
a smaller time lag between the moment at which decision-making concerning labor is 
made and the moment at which the price of an output becomes known decreases the price 
of the good with uncertain demand, and thus makes the country more competitive in the 
international market for this commodity. This important result can be formulated as the 
following corollary: 
 
Corollary 1.  An increase in labor market flexibility makes a country more competitive in 
international markets for commodities with uncertain demand.    
Proof.  
As it is mentioned in section 3, lower market flexibility implies a slower 
adjustment of labor input to market conditions, and thus increases the time period 
between the moment when the firm’s input/output decision needs to be made and the 
                                                          
14 This result is consistent with Sandmo (1971) among others. We need to mention that Batra and Ullah 
(1974) show that in any case an increase in uncertainty leads to a decline in the firm’s output if absolute 
risk aversion is decreasing. 
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moment when the output is supplied to the market and real output price is observed (see 
Figure 1). This in turn implies that if labor market flexibility decreases, the uncertainty 
about demand at the moment of decision making (and price variability) increases (and 
vice versa). Consequently, by Proposition 2, an increase in labor market flexibility 
decreases the expected relative prices of goods with uncertain demand with respect to 
ones with certain demand. In other words, higher labor market flexibility leads to the 
reduction of absolute prices of goods with uncertain demand, and, therefore, makes a 
country more competitive in international markets for the commodities with uncertain 
demand. 
          Q.E.D. 
 
The other important implication of Proposition 2 is that differences in labor market 
flexibility, determining a time lag between the time when a decision concerning labor is 
made and the time when prices for output became known, and thus price variability in the 
time of decision making, lead to different expected relative prices, and, consequently, 
may change patterns of trade or cause international exchange of goods. 
 
5. The impact of labor market flexibility on international trade patterns 
Consider a world of two countries, A and B, and assume that each of the two 
countries has only one scarce factor of production (labor), and can produce two goods, X 
and Y. Production technologies are described by unit labor requirements aLiJ , where 
J∈{A, B} and i∈{X,Y}. Assume that the unit price of commodity Y is deterministic and 
the unit price of commodity X is uncertain. Suppose also that the labor market in country 
A is more flexible than in country B, which implies that input/output decisions in sector X 
in country B have to be made earlier than in country A, and, consequently, that deviation 
of expected relative prices from relative prices in the deterministic case in country B is 
always greater than in country A. This may change the pattern of trade predicted by the 
classical Ricardian model in the way described by one of the propositions below. 
 
Proposition 3.  Two countries, identical with respect to production technology and labor 
productivity, can be involved in international trade: the country with a 
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more flexible labor market will tend to export goods with uncertain 
demand, while the country with a more rigid labor market will tend to 
export goods with deterministic demand. 
Proof. 
Lack of differences in production technology and labor productivity imply that  
(24)                        aLXA/aLYA=aLXB/aLYB,  
i.e., in the deterministic case no country has a comparative advantage, and therefore 
international exchange of goods is not observed. Proposition 2 implies that under 
uncertainty higher labor market flexibility in country A will result in smaller expected 
relative prices in country A than expected relative prices in country B, and, consequently, 
country A will tend to export good X (with uncertain demand) while country B will tend 
to export good Y (with deterministic demand). 
          Q.E.D. 
 
The Proposition 4 implies that a rational for international trade exists even if there 
is no comparative advantage in the sense of differences among countries in technology 
and labor efficiency. Under uncertainty, a difference in labor market flexibility is the only 
reason for comparative advantage and international exchange of goods. 
  
Proposition 4.  Under uncertainty, differences in labor market regulations may change 
trade patterns resulting from a comparative advantage in labor 
productivity and production technology.  
Proof.  
In the deterministic case, country B has a comparative advantage in producing X if 
(25)                    aLXA/aLYA>aLXB/aLYB . 
Consequently, country B has also lower relative prices of goods X and Y, and thus it 
exports good X in exchange for good Y. Proposition 2 implies that under uncertainty, 
expected relative prices in country A (with a more flexible labor market) may rise less 
than expected relative prices in country B (with a more rigid labor market), and, 
consequently, country A will tend to export good X while country B will tend to export 
good Y. So, in this case difference in labor market flexibility changes the trade pattern 
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predicted based on comparative advantage in labor productivity and production 
technology. 
Q.E.D. 
An important implication of Proposition 4 is that in the real world, where 
input/output decisions concerning production of most goods are made under uncertainty, 
trade patterns can differ from ones that follow from classical economic theory under 
certainty.    
 
6. Empirical evidence  
This section deals with empirical evidence where the following testable 
proposition is postulated: the share of export of the sectors with high variation of firm 
sales increases with labor market flexibility. The hypothesis reflects theoretical results 
formulated as Proposition 2, Corollary 1, and Proposition 3. In particular, a high degree 
of labor market flexibility allows firms facing demand uncertainty to more quickly adjust 
their production capacities to shifts in demand. The reallocation of labor across firms 
within a certain industry is reflected in the change of sales of firms and industry groups as 
well (see Proposition 2 and Corollary 1). Since in a country with a more flexible labor 
market the scale of firms’ adjustment is much higher (i.e., there are substantial labor and 
production shifts across industry groups), a country with a more flexible labor market 
tends to export more goods with variable demand (as indicated in Proposition 3). On the 
contrary, in a country with a more rigid labor market, labor and production shifts across 
industry groups are much smaller, and therefore, countries with a more rigid labor market 
tend to export goods with stable demand.   
In order to test the hypothesis formulated above, we analyse the impact of labor 
market regulations on export demand variability within the manufacturing sector. The 
equation specification is of the following panel regression form:  
(26)         ,21 ititit uLMFWVAR ++= αα  
where LMFit reflects the labor market flexibility index, uit is the error term, and the 
dependent variable denotes the weighted variances of firms’ sales (WVARit), the fraction 
of an industry’s exports with high variation of the firm’s sales. It is determined as the 
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weighted variation of a single firm’s sales, which are calculated across years, from the mean 
variation across all industries, whose export shares are taken as corresponding weights:  
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where I is a number of countries, T number of years, and J number of  industries; 
w is the weight or the share of an individual industry’s export (ex) in the total 
exports of all industries (EX); q denotes the average sale of a single firm.  
The hypothesis test is H0: α2=0, against H1: α2>0. That is, the fraction of an industry’s 
exports with high variation of firms’ sales increases with the degree of labor market 
flexibility (i.e., α2 is positive).  
By pooling all the available observations that cover data from 37 countries (I=37) 
including the values of exports, the number of establishments, the volume of sales across 
61 manufacturing products (J=61), and the labor market flexibility indexes for the period 
1995 to 2002 (T=8),15 the regression coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS), random effect (RE) and fixed effect (FE) models. The data for the export products 
and the number of establishments come from the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization’s (UNIDO) Industrial Statistics Database and national statistics offices 
databases at the three digit level of International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
of revision 2. As the proxy of labor market flexibility, the employment law indexes, 
which are presented in Global Competitiveness Yearbook (GCY) by the International 
Institute for Management Development (IMD) are used. Table 2 demonstrates the 
statistical moments of the main variables included in model estimation.  
                                                          
15A comparable data set is not yet available for 2003 and 2004 for all products and countries included in the 
study.   
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model 
  Minimum  Maximum  Median  Mean  Std. dev.  Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
LMF 1.1922 8.3612 4.7119 4.8109 1.3337 0.1781 2.6536 
VWAR 0.0133 249.9037 6.6709 16.2196 25.5625 4.9215 39.5923 
Source: the author’s calculations 
 
In terms of statistical descriptors, which are presented in Table 2, the labor market 
flexibility indexes are characterized by better properties than those of the weighted 
variances. The labor market flexibility indexes, for example, range from a minimum of 
1.1922 to a maximum of 8.3612 with a mean value of 4.8109 and a standard deviation of 
1.3337, indicating that the presence of extreme outliers is not likely in the data. The 
dependent variable, however, lies in a range from a minimum 0.0133 to a maximum 
249.9037 with a mean of 16.2196 and a standard deviation 25.5625. Hence, in terms of 
the third and fourth moments, labor market flexibility indexes are better distributed than 
the weighted variances, as demonstrated in Figure 2.  
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b) 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The shapes of distribution: a) LMF; b) WVAR 
 
It follows from Figure 2 that the shape of the distribution plotted on the labor market 
flexibility indexes is closer to that of normal distribution, while the distribution of the 
weighted variations of firms’ sales is very leptokurtic with most of the data concentrated 
within a more narrow range.16 High kurtosis reflects few large values of the weighted 
variation of firms’ sales (see Figure 3). 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Weighted variances in panel data  
                                                          
 
16Normal distributions are characterized by the kurtosis equal to 3 (see Green 2001). 
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The comparison of weighted variances across countries identifies Hungary, where the 
variance increased from 60 to 260 in 2001, as an outlier in the sample data and, thus, it is 
excluded from the data set. The results of an econometric estimation are demonstrated in 
Table 3.  
 
Table 2. The estimation parameters of OLS (the panel for I=36 countries and T=8 years) 
 
Dependent variable 
Independent variables   
WVARit  
C, LMFit
Regression modelsI 
Coefficient estimates 
Pooled OLS Pooled OLS  
(White-robust SE) 
RE-model FE-model 
Constant term α1  -10.2650      (4.1128)* 
   - 10.2650 
     (3.9729)* 
-0.4336   
0.7919 
 -0.2221 
(0.3081) 
The LMF index α2  4.9806  (0.8293)* 
      4.9806 
     (0.8850)* 
3.3518   
(0.7489)* 
2.5479   
(0.5015)* 
R-squared   0.1252       0.1252 0.0949 0.0851 
Prob. (F-statistic) of zero 
slope   0.0000       0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
95% confidence interval of 
α2   [3.35,  6.61] [3.24, 6.72] [1.88, 4.83]  [1.56, 3.53] 
Hausman specification test: FE versus RE 
χ2 (1) = [(α2,FE-α2,RE)'[(V_α2,FE -V_α2,RE)^(-1)](α2,FE-α2,RE)= 1.46 
χ2 (1)critical = 3.84 
χ2 <χ2critical  
IThe estimated asymptotic standard errors (SE) are shown in the brackets below the estimated coefficients: 
(*) indicates a 1%  significance level. 
 
As Table 2 demonstrates, the results of pooled OLS reveal the presence of a positive first-
order serial correlation in residuals as presented in Table 3 (the Durbin-Watson statistics 
is 0.07).17 The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, which is tested by computing White 
statistics by regressing the squared least squares residuals on a constant, LMF, and LMF2 
(NRT2=8.32∼χ2) is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of heteroscedasticity.18 
These findings suggest that standard errors and estimated coefficients are not valid to 
make an inference.  Since the residuals are not independent, the RE model is applied, but 
first, the model with robust estimation is performed and regression models with robust 
standard errors are applied. The robust 95% confidence interval is wider than both the 
                                                          
17 The null hypothesis of no AR(1) serial correlation in OLS residuals is rejected at the 5% level. 
18 The 5% critical value from the table for the chi-squared statistics with 2 degrees of freedom is 5.99.  
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previously estimated OLS and RE regression results by 0.22 and 0.53, correspondingly. 
In order to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator, we estimate the FE-model and 
perform a Hausman specification test.19 As reported in Table 3, the reported χ2 value is 
smaller than the critical value, so that the H0 cannot be rejected at the 5% significance 
level. This suggests that the RE-model is the preferred option for making an inference.   
Based on the results obtained by the RE-model, one can infer that an 1 point 
higher degree of labor market flexibility corresponds to a 3.35 point larger variation of 
firm sales weighted by export industry export shares. The estimated R2 explains about 
9.94% of the variation. The empirical evidence confirms the presence of a significant 
positive relationship between labor market flexibility and the export shares of sectors 
with high variation of firms’ sales. This can imply that firms respond to demand 
fluctuations by reallocating inputs to the production of goods with higher world demand 
which causes an increase in the variation of sales across firms as well as industry groups. 
As a result, a country with more flexible labor market is more competitive in goods with 
flexible demand and exports more goods with higher variation of sales due to the fact that 
the scale of firms’ adjustment is much higher and there are substantial labor and 
production shifts across industry groups. On the contrary, in a country with a more rigid 
labor market, the variation of exports across industry groups is smaller due to lower 
adjustment speed. Therefore, countries with a more rigid labor market tend to export 
goods with more stable demand.   
 
7. Conclusion  
The analysis above explored the links between labor market regulations and 
prices of commodities with uncertain demand, relative prices within the country and 
patterns of trade. It has been shown that since flexible labor market regulations allow 
companies to adapt to changes in demand quickly, firms’ decisions regarding labor input 
may be made based on better predictions (i.e., under smaller uncertainty), which  
improves economic efficiency leading to better allocation of resources. This in turn leads 
to lower prices of the commodities with uncertain demand within countries and makes 
                                                          
19The hypothesis test is that the individual country-specific effects are uncorrelated with the other 
repressors in the model. 
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them more competitive on international markets for these products. Since in the real 
world, suppliers of most commodities and services face uncertain demand, a high degree 
of labor market flexibility may significantly increase competitiveness of all countries 
including those with high wage levels. On the contrary, rigid labor market regulations 
may increase prices for most goods and services within countries and thus decrease 
competitiveness of these countries, even those with relatively low wages.   
These theoretical results have been confronted with empirical evidence and a 
positive correlation between labor market flexibility and export variation across product 
groups has been confirmed. This implies that in response to world demand shifts, 
countries with flexible labor markets can reallocate labor across industry groups towards 
production of goods with higher demand. This causes an increase in the variation of sales 
across firms and industry groups as well. As a result, countries with more flexible labor 
markets export more goods with higher variation of sales due to the fact that the scale of 
firms’ adjustment is much higher.  On the contrary, in countries with more rigid labor 
markets, the variation of exports across industry groups is smaller due to lower 
adjustment speed, and the exports of goods with more stable demand is larger. The link 
between labor market flexibility and relative prices of goods in autarky explored in the 
paper reveals also that there would be a justification for international trade between 
identical countries even if markets are perfectly competitive. International exchange of 
goods with different price variability may stem from differences in labor market 
institutional settings. Simple analysis of possible trade patterns in a modified Ricardian 
setting shows that even if countries are similar in all respects (e.g., labor productivity or 
technology), but have differences in labor market regulations, then international trade 
among these countries can be observed, and a country with a flexible labor market will 
tend to export goods with variable demand, while a country with a rigid labor market will 
tend to export goods with stable demand.  
Since an increase in labor market flexibility has a positive impact on countries’ 
international competitiveness and thus on their balance of trade, a number of actions 
which may help liberalize labor markets can be recommended to both developed and 
developing counties. Generally, measures for increasing labor market flexibility require 
policy actions on several different levels. Firstly, removing the sources of labor market 
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rigidities through institutional arrangements and changes in labor legislation at the macro 
level is widely recommended. The policy actions at this level involve measures for 
reducing the power of unions, the role of collective bargaining, and the level of 
employment protection. From the perspective of labor market flexibility at the intra-
enterprise level, regulations can be accomplished through increasing wage and working 
hours flexibility, eliminating incentives for wage arrears, restructuring social assets, and 
using such active adjustment mechanisms as training and retraining policies. Such 
measures ease the movement of workers from one job to another and lower the cost of 
dismissals by inducing employers to fire workers with obsolete skills and hire new 
workers. It needs to be emphasized, however, that policy actions in a concrete country or 
region should be designed taking into account the specific environment, including 
macroeconomic conditions, the level of market development, value system, cultural 
heritage and many other factors.    
There are many ways in which this study can be extended and generalized. In 
particular, the problem considered in the paper can be presented in a broader framework 
using a standard two countries, two commodities and two production-factors model 
(Heckscher-Ohlin model). Such an analysis, although quite complicated (see Appendix), 
can lead to a number of interesting conclusions regarding, e.g., the impact of labor market 
regulations on relative prices of labor and capital intensive commodities with different 
demand uncertainty, predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and the Rybczynski 
theorem, as well as on the distribution of welfare within trading countries, and thus on 
poverty reduction.      
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Appendix 
Labor market flexibility and relative prices of goods in a two factors and two sectors 
model under uncertainty 
 
Consider a single economy with two perfectly competitive sectors, one of them 
producing a commodity X and the second one – a commodity Y. There are two factors of 
production: capital (K) and labor (L) available in fixed supply. Assume that production 
technology in the sectors X and Y can be characterized by Cobb-Douglass production 
functions fX and fY:  fX(KX,LX)= LXα KX1-α (0<α<1) and fY(KY,LY)= LYβ KY1-β (0<β<1), 
where LX, KX and LY, KY are the amounts of labor and capital employed in the industries X 
and Y, respectively. Following the analysis presented in Section 4, all firms are assumed 
to be managed by risk-averse managers and, therefore, their attitudes towards risk can be 
characterized in a von Neumann-Morgenstern fashion in the form of a utility function 
[risk aversion implies that utility function U of profit π is strictly concave: U’(π)>0 and 
U’’(π)<0]. Consumption patterns can be derived from the following utility functions 
U(QX, QY) = QXσ QY1-σ (0<σ<1), where QX, QY denote  the quantities of goods X and Y 
consumed, respectively; but in the analysis which follows we assume that the demand of 
commodity X is always uncertain, while the demand of commodity Y is known for sure at 
any moment of time. 
In order to simplify the analysis, following the considerations presented in Section 
3, assume that an error term in the prediction of price is a normally distributed random 
variable with zero mean and variance σt2 (this corresponds to the case when random 
deviations follow stochastic processes with normally distributed random terms such as, 
for example, the autoregressive process of any order).20 Since the distribution of the total 
random deviation from the mean value of price is normal, the total deviation can take a 
positive or a negative value, each having probability ½. Namely, the expected values of a 
                                                          
20 It should be stressed that although the assumption of the normal distribution of the random deviations 
from the expected price corresponds to the wide class of stochastic processes that would govern stochastic 
price movement, it is chosen solely for simplicity and clarity, and no attempt is made at generality. We 
believe, however, that many of the qualitative results would hold also in more general, and, consequently, 
more complicated models.  
 24
positive and a negative value equal π/σ 2t  and π/σ 2t− , correspondingly.21 
Consequently, the price of commodity X at any time t (such that -∞<t<+∞) can be 
approximated as ,)(P tx σϑ+  where )( tσϑ  is a random factor (not known ex-ante) that 
equals θ(σt) with probability ½ and -θ(σt) with probability ½, respectively [θ(σt) 
= π/σ 2t ]. So, the price of commodity X is presented as )(P tx σθ−  with probability ½ 
and )(P tσθ+  with probability ½. In such a framework we can prove the following 
proposition:  
 
Proposition A1. An increase in labor market flexibility decreases the expected relative 
price of goods X with respect to good Y and makes the country more 
competitive in international markets for a commodity with uncertain 
demand.    
Proof.  
Perfect competition implies that the profits of all firms operating in industry Y 
(with certain demand) equal zero. The cost function of firms operating in industry Y is 
described as  
  waraYC LYKY +=)( .                                             (A.1) 
The terms r and w in the expression (A.1) denote the price of capital and labor, and aK,Y  
and aL,Y are the amounts of capital and labor needed to produce one unit of commodity Y, 
respectively. 
To allocate resources, the firms operating in sector Y solve the following 
optimization problem: 
)(
,
waraMin LYKYaa LYKY
+ ,  s.t. 11 =−ββ LYKY aa . 
The Lagrangian for this optimization problem can be represented as 
                                                          
21 Expected values of positive and negative deviations are computed as ηπσ
η ση ~~
~
de
2
2
t
2
t
2
0
2
t
t
−∞∫  and 
t
2
2
t
t de
2
2
z
2
t
ηπσ
η ση ~~
~
0 −
∞−
∫ ,  respectively ( t~η  prediction error equals). 
 25
)1( 1 −−+= −ββξ LYKYLYKY aawaraL , 
and FOC22 imply that  
KY
LY
a
a
w
r
β
β
−= 1 .                                                            (A.2) 
In industry X (facing uncertain demand), the firms behave purely competitively, 
know their cost functions with certainty, and maximize expected utility from profit. The 
Cobb-Douglas production function implies that there is perfect substitution between 
production factors, so that firms can optimally adjust their input combination in response 
to changes in demand conditions. The crucial assumption is that labor is completely 
variable, whereas capital is quasi-fixed. In the consideration below this is taken into 
account by assuming that capital input is chosen ex-ante (i.e., before actual demand is 
observed),23 whereas demand for labor takes place ex-post (i.e., after choice of capital, 
however, if the labor market is not perfectly flexible also before an actual demand is 
observed). Therefore, the firm’s input decisions are distributed in time as presented in 
Figure A1 and, consequently, both decisions are taken under uncertainty of demand. 
Decisions regarding the amount of capital are made at time T1 [facing price fluctuations 
)(
1T
σγ ], while decisions regarding the amount of labor are made at time T2 [facing price 
fluctuations )(
2T
σλ ]. So, as T1≤T2, we have 21 TT σσ >  and )( 1Tσγ > )( 2Tσλ . In order to 
simplify notations in the analysis which follows, we will refer to price fluctuations in the 
moments of time T1 and T2 as to γ and λ, respectively. 
 
                   
   T1               T2        T3  time                   
Decision about the amount of capital           Decision about the amount of labor             Real demand revealed 
 
Figure A.1. Timing of a firm’s input decisions in industry X 
 
                                                          
22 The Hessian of the Lagrangian is positive semi definite and thus the second order conditions to this 
optimization problem hold. 
23 Capital expenditures should be understood as irreversible investments costs required to purchase and tune 
machines, design and prepare specific moulds and tools. 
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Under uncertainty, the firms maximize expected utility from profit. To simplify 
the analysis assume that the exact shape of the utility function U is specified as follows:24  
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πππ       
where a> b>0  and ππ << 0Π .25 
Thus, for any given amount of capital selected in time T1, firms set the amount of labor 
(in time T2) considering the following optimization problem (production function implies 
labor demand function is α
α
α
11 −
= XxX kql , where qx denotes the output of a single firm):  
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φλα α
α −= −11 KXX waP                                                                   (A.3) 
where aK,X  denotes the amount of capital needed to produce one unit of commodity X. 
In time T1, firms facing demand fluctuations γ (γ≥0) take the price of the 
commodity as given and set their output assuming that the amount of labor will be 
determined in time T2 (facing demand fluctuations λ, γ≥λ≥0). So, output is set as a 
                                                          
24  See Cukrowski, Fischer and Aksen (2002).  
25 Note that for a> b>0 the function defined is concave and twice differentiable if π∈(-∞,∞)\Πz0. 
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function of labor, considering the following optimization problem (the production 
function implies the capital demand function is 11
1
−−= α
α
α
XxX lqk ): 
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where  aL,X  denotes amount of labor needed to produce one unit of commodity X. 
From (*) and (A.3) it follows that φλαφγα α
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Homogeneity of degree one of the production functions [fX(KX,LX)= LXα KX1-α, (0<α<1) 
and fY(KY,LY)= LYβ KY1-β (0<β<1)] implies that 
11 =−ββ KYLY aa                                                                              (A.5) 
and 
11 =−αα KXLX aa .                                                                                 (A.6) 
Full resource utilization implies that  
  LaQaQ LXXLYY =+                                                                   (A.7) 
and 
  KQXaaQ KXKYY =+  .                                                     (A.8) 
The relative demand function for goods X and Y can be derived (in the moment T3) from 
the maximization of consumers’ utility function under the budget constraints 
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σσ −1
, XYQQ
QQMax
YX
 ,    s. t. MQPQP XXYY ≤+ , 
where PY, PX denote, respectively, the prices of good Y and X, and M is consumer’s 
budget. The Lagrangian for this problem can be represented as 
)(1 MQPQPQQ XXYYXY −+−= − ξσσL  
F.O.C.28 
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σ
−= 1 . 
Setting PY as a numeraire good with price equal to 1 (i.e., PY=1), relative demand 
can be represented as  
X
Y
X Q
QP σ
σ−= 1 .                                                                 (A.9) 
The autarky equilibrium in the economy can be characterized by the set of 
equations (A.1-A.9), which can be solved with respect to nine unknown variables: QY , 
QX, aK,Y, aK,X, aL,Y, aL,X, w, r, PX . 
Assuming for simplicity that 2/1=σ  ( 11 =−σ
σ ) and βα −=1 , the system of 
equations can be represented as follows: 
 
                                                          
28The Hessian of the Lagrangian is negative semi definite and thus the second order conditions to this 
optimization problem hold. 
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Solving it with respect to Px and rearranging, we get 
 
                                             . (A.11) 
In order to determine the pattern of changes in the expected relative price Px with 
respect to price fluctuations λ observed in moment Td2 (dP/dxλ), define the following 
function:  
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the pattern of changes can be determined (by an Envelope Theorem) based on the analysis 
of the sign of the following expression: 
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The denominator in the expression above is always greater than zero and numerator is 
smaller than zero if and only if  0
2
21 <+
−++ φλ
φ
α
α
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φ
XX PP
. Taking into account that 
φ is always negative, the expression above can be represented as 
))(12()2( φλαφλα +−>+ XX PP  and after rearrangement as 0)1( >−+ αφλXP . 
Since 0>+φλXP  (see A.3) and 0<α<1, the condition above is always satisfied, and thus  
0
/
// >−=
X
X dPdH
ddHddP λλ .                                                              (A.14) 
Since price fluctuations λ, which are observed at the moment of decision-making 
regarding labor input, is inversely related to the variation of labor market flexibility, an 
increase in the degree of labor market flexibility causes the expected relative price of 
good X (with respect to good Y) to fall. The underlying mechanism for this is the 
following: the higher the degree of labor market flexibility, the shorter is the time interval 
between moments T3 and T2, during which labor adjusts to changes in the market 
demand. Consequently, price fluctuations λ observed at time T2 are smaller as well. And, 
because the price of commodity Y does not change, an increase in labor market flexibility 
decreases the price of good X relative to Y and thus makes the country more competitive 
in producing and exporting the commodity with uncertain demand on international 
markets. 
Q.E.D. 
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